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Local elections campaign posters in a square in Damascus, August
2018. Photo credit: Myriam Youssef.
External vision
The non-paper presented in early 2018 by the Syria Small Group (which
includes Britain, France, Germany, Jordan, the USA and Saudi Arabia)
proposed that the Syrian parliament should consist of two houses. The
second house is envisaged to be constructed and constituted upon
regional representation “in order to affect the decision making in the
central government”. It also discusses the balance of regional interests,
and providing clear authorities and guidelines to regional governments
according to the principles of decentralisation. In another recent paper
by the same group entitled “Principles for a resolution of the Syria
con ict,” it is proposed that “Authority should be explicitly devolved and
decentralized, including on a regional basis”. Currently there is only one
house in Syria, the People’s Assembly.
The idea of having two houses in the parliament in Syria, with one
devoted to region-based representation, was never proposed by any
political actor in Syria. It  rst appeared in the Russian-proposed
constitution for Syria, which was leaked in mid-2016 and was later
handed to the representatives of the opposition in one of the Astana
meetings in January 2017. The Russian version suggests a region-
based assembly which shares legislative power with the people’s
assembly. In addition to legislative power, the region-based assembly
would have the power to announce presidential elections, hold no
con dence in the government, and ratify international treaties and
conventions including agreements granting concessions to foreign
companies and issuing general amnesties. It is suggested that the
assembly be constituted by representatives of administrative units, but
it is not clear whether these representatives would be appointed or
elected, nor what election laws would apply.
The Syrian reality
Before 2011, the authority of the Syrian state was very centralised. The
state’s distribution of economic and natural resources was very biased
and regionally disproportionate. Regions richest in natural resources,
like the northeast, received very little back from the centre and had the
lowest development indexes in the country. Mayors, as well as all
important decision makers in every region, were appointed by
Damascus and drew their legitimacy from this appointment and their
relations to the power structure in the capital, not from the local
population. Ethnic minorities, particularly Kurds, were deprived of their
cultural rights and many of them were deprived of other essential rights,
including the basic right to a citizenship. The rule of the supposedly
secular and Arab Nationalist al-Ba’ath party selectively suppressed the
expression of ethnic and sectarian identities, but, in its attempt to co-
opt the local population and compensate for its weak legitimacy, it
played on identity politics and manipulated tribal, sectarian and ethnic
divides.
Seven years of war led to the fragmentation of the state’s centrality and
paved the way for the rise of local and regional elites. Some areas went
completely outside government control. The northeast is now governed
by the Syria Democratic Forces, overwhelmingly controlled by the
Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (PYD) party, and has extended its control to
areas taken from IS like Al-Raqqa. The USA also has a strong in uence
and presence in the northeast. Within this region Kurds are now freely
practicing their cultural rights and have enjoyed more independence.
However several reports point out that other minorities in these areas
have been subjected to oppressive practices  and signs of frustration
and unrest by Arabs in the areas taken from ISIS are emerging .
The north-west is divided mainly between two areas. The  rst one is
directly controlled by Turkey, including Afrin which is populated by
Kurdish majority. Turkey imposed armed control of Afrin by Arab forces
operating outside of Afrin and who have been committing numerous
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violations against the population. The second area in the north-east
(mainly Idlib) is controlled by the armed opposition and extremist
groups with signi cant Turkish in uence and armed presence. Although
civic local administrative councils were formed in Idlib, decision making
is still dominated by warlords and armed actors who have been
attempting to mobilise local communities with the use of sectarian
rhetorical tools.
Authority has also been fragmented within government- held areas
itself, often leading to the rise of regional and local elites. These elites
essentially draw their legitimacy from pervasive ethno-sectarian
rationalities and their monopolisation and instrumentalisation of
violence, as well as their control over the economy. Russia and Iran
have also been able to substantially in uence decision making within
government-held areas, both in the centre and in some of the regions.
Across Syria, mobilisation based on identity has been practiced by
nearly all actors especially in relation to violence. Mobilising the youth
to join militias became increasingly based on ethnic and sectarian
narratives, and external support has played a major role in this
sectarianisation process too. Civil society however remained by and
large much more resistant to the identity divides.
Decentralisation? Or empowering con ict elites?  
All of this leaves many open questions to be answered regarding the
proposed region-based representation in Syria.
Syria is in need of decentralisation. It has been discussed widely in
policy circles and among Syrians as an answer to many of the structural
problems they have experienced and suffered from, both prior to and
after the uprisings. But there is yet no consensus among Syrians on the
level of this decentralisation. Syrian Kurdish political parties call for a
federal Syria, but this is widely rejected by Syrians both on popular and
elite levels in areas that do not have Kurdish majority.
This leave us with the question of whether the externally proposed
representation on a regional basis in Syria during or just after a con ict
is the right level and form of decentralisation that the country needs.
The proposal could hold its own set of opportunities, but could also
have serious undesired consequences.
Drawing from the experience of other countries where similar systems
were adopted post-con ict, there are four main areas of concerns that
need to be answered in relation to adopting regional-based
representation in Syria. These are:
1. Could it possibly further entrench social and societal divides, along
ethno-sectarian fault lines, and reward populists who mobilised people
during the con ict along ethnic and sectarian lines? Could such a
situation trigger more tension and con ict in the future between
different areas?
2. Could it lead to rewarding warlords and violent elites and the creation
of regional tyrants and oppression of the minorities within these
regions?
3. Could it be an alternative to power sharing? And would such power
sharing end the con ict or just shift it to a lower level at multiple sites?
4. Could it entrench external intervention and/or nurture and
institutionalise local populations’ structural dependency on foreign
powers and other nation-states?
Before considering region-based representation in Syria in a new
constitution, these questions and many other relevant ones need to be
answered to prevent potential encoding of the con ict in the
constitution itself which could only lead to further con icts and
instabilities. What Syria needs is a democratisation processes which is
protected by the constitution and the law, and which protects the rights
of each citizen regardless of  which area they live in, and what ethnic or
sectarian identity they hold.
A second house dominated by regional elites who emerged during the
war could mean a decentralisation of oppression rather than ending the
oppression through democratisation processes.
 
For example, Amnesty report ‘We had nowhere else to go’: Forced
displacement and demolitions in northern Syria’
 For example: demonstrations in Deir al Zor and in Raqqa
 
Note: The CRP blogs gives the views of the author, not the position of
the Con ict Research Programme, the London School of Economics
and Political Science, or the UK Government.
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